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Abstract
Adversarial examples cause neural networks to produce
incorrect outputs with high confidence. Although adversar-
ial training is one of the most effective forms of defense
against adversarial examples, unfortunately, a large gap ex-
ists between test accuracy and training accuracy in adver-
sarial training. In this paper, we identify Adversarial Fea-
ture Overfitting (AFO), which may cause poor adversarially
robust generalization, and we show that adversarial train-
ing can overshoot the optimal point in terms of robust gen-
eralization, leading to AFO in our simple Gaussian model.
Considering these theoretical results, we present soft label-
ing as a solution to the AFO problem. Furthermore, we pro-
pose Adversarial Vertex mixup (AVmixup), a soft-labeled
data augmentation approach for improving adversarially
robust generalization. We complement our theoretical anal-
ysis with experiments on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, SVHN, and
Tiny ImageNet, and show that AVmixup significantly im-
proves the robust generalization performance and that it
reduces the trade-off between standard accuracy and ad-
versarial robustness.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have produced impres-
sive results for various machine learning tasks, including
computer vision [16] and natural language processing [11].
Neural networks, however, can be easily fooled by small
adversarial perturbations of their input with a high degree
of confidence [35]. This vulnerability of DNNs has led to
the proposal of several methods to defend adversarial at-
tacks [28, 22, 31, 44]. Despite these attempts, many of
these defenses have been defeated by strong adversarial at-
tacks [17, 19, 3], or were eventually found to rely on obfus-
cated gradients [1].
Adversarial training [19] is one of the most effective
adversarial defense methods which substitutes adversarial
*Correspondence to: Sungroh Yoon sryoon@snu.ac.kr.
examples for the training samples. Given a dataset D =
{(xi, yi)}ni=1 with xi ∈ Rd as an example in the d-
dimensional input space and yi as its associated label, the
goal of adversarial training is to train models by using ad-
versarial empirical risk minimization [19]:
min
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈S
L(x+ δ, y; θ)
]
. (1)
Here, L(x+ δ, y; θ) is the loss function on adversarial
examples, and S represents the set of perturbations an ad-
versary can apply to deceive the model, which is normally
the set of `p-bounded perturbations.
Many studies of the properties of these adversarial per-
turbations have been reported. Gilmer et al. [7] noted that
the phenomenon of adversarial examples appears because
most high dimensional data points in the data distribution
are very close to the points that could be adversarial exam-
ples. Schmidt et al. [32] proved that robust training requires
significantly larger sample complexity than that of stan-
dard training, postulating that the difficulty of robust train-
ing originates from the large sample complexity. Tsipras et
al. [36] showed that a trade-off may exist between adver-
sarial robustness and standard accuracy. They argued that
the features learned during adversarial training differ from
those learned during standard training, and attributed the
trade-off to this difference.
Recently, Ilyas et al. [13] demonstrated that the features
used to train deep learning models can be divided into ad-
versarially robust features and non-robust features, and the
problem of adversarial examples may arise from these non-
robust features. Then, if adversarial examples are features,
rather than bugs, it is natural to wonder: Could we take into
account the generalization between “adversarial features”
in our adversarial training? If so, is the large gap between
test accuracy and training accuracy under adversarial per-
turbations during adversarial training caused by the failure
of adversarial feature generalization?
Motivated by these questions, we present a theoretical
model which demonstrates the robust generalization perfor-
mance changes during adversarial training. Specifically, we
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define a generalization problem of adversarial training and
show that our proposed method can alleviate the generaliza-
tion problem. In summary, our paper makes the following
contributions:
• We present a theoretical analysis which demonstrates the
extent to which the change in the variance of the feature
representations affects the robust generalization.
• We uncover Adversarial Feature Overfitting (AFO), the
phenomenon of the model overfitting to the adversarial
features during adversarial training leading to poor robust
generalization.
• We propose Adversarial Vertex mixup (AVmixup), a soft-
labeled data augmentation approach for adversarial train-
ing in a collaborative fashion.
• We analyze our proposed method with the results of ex-
periments on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, SVHN, and Tiny Im-
agenet, and show that AVmixup substantially increases
the effectiveness of state-of-the-art adversarial training
methods.
2. Background
2.1. Adversarially Robust Generalization
Schmidt et al. [32] showed that the sample complexity
for robust generalization can be much larger than the sample
complexity for standard generalization by constructing a toy
example as follows:
Example 1. (Schmidt et al.) Let θ? ∈ Rd be the per-class
mean vector and let σ > 0 be the variance parameter. Then
the (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model is defined by the following dis-
tribution over (x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1}
y
u.a.r.∼ {−1,+1}, x i.i.d.∼ N (y · θ?, σ2I). (2)
Here, the difficulty of the binary classification task is
controlled by adjusting the variance parameter σ which im-
plies the amount of overlap between the two classes.
To characterize robust generalization, the definitions of
standard and robust classification error are defined as fol-
lows (Schmidt et al.):
Definition 1. Let Q : Rd × {±1} −→ R be a distribution.
Then the standard classification error β of a classifier f :
Rd −→ {±1} is defined as β = P(x,y)∼Q[f(x) 6= y].
Definition 2. Let Q : Rd × {±1} −→ R be a distribution
and let S ∈ Rd be a perturbation set that the adversary
could apply to fool the model. Then the S-robust classifica-
tion error β of a classifier f : Rd −→ {±1} is defined as
β = P(x,y)∼Q[∃δ ∈ S : f(x+ δ) 6= y].
Hence, the `p-robustness is defined as robustness with
respect to the perturbation set S = {δ ∈ Rd | ‖δ‖p ≤ }. In
our work, we focus on `∞-bounded perturbations, because
this is the most common type in the context of adversarial
perturbations [19, 17, 44, 41].
To calculate the sample complexities for robust and stan-
dard generalization, Schmidt et al. [32] used the following
linear classifier model:
Definition 3. (Schmidt et al.) Let (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈
Rd × {±1} be drawn i.i.d. from a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model
with ‖θ?‖2 =
√
d. Let the weight vectorw ∈ Rd be the unit
vector in the direction of z¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 yixi. Then the linear
classifier fn,σ is defined as
fn,σ = sgn(w>x). (3)
It was shown that the linear classifier can achieve satis-
factory generalization performance even with a single sam-
ple when the variance of the data distribution is small. The
upper `∞-bound of adversarial perturbations was also de-
rived for a certain `∞-robust classification error under the
same conditions with standard classification.
2.2. Robust and Non-robust Features
Recent studies [36, 13] considered the adversarial ro-
bustness in the existence of a distinction between robust
features and non-robust features. They noted that adversar-
ial examples can arise from the non-robust features of input
data which are useful for standard classification but have
an adverse effect on robust classification [13]. They pro-
vided evidence to support the hypothesis by showing that
non-robust features alone are sufficient for standard classi-
fication but not for robust classification. They also demon-
strated that standard training on the set of robust features
yields a fairly small robust classification error.
Tsipras et al. [36] indicated that the existence of a prov-
able trade-off between standard accuracy and its robustness.
They theoretically showed the possibility that adversarial
robustness is incompatible with standard accuracy in a sim-
ple setting using a Gaussian model. In addition, they empha-
sized that adversarial training may reduce the contribution
of non-robust features to zero with the following lemma:
Lemma 1. (Tsipras et al.) Minimizing the adversarial em-
pirical risk results in a classifier that assigns 0 weight to
non-robust features.
2.3. Soft Labeling
Szegedy et al. [34] proposed label-smoothing as a mech-
anism to regularize the classifier. They argued that maxi-
mizing the log-likelihood of the correct label may result in
overfitting, and label-smoothing can alleviate the overfitting
problem.
Zhang et al. [40] introduced a novel data augmentation
method named Mixup. Mixup constructs virtual training ex-
amples as follows:
x˜ = αxi + (1− α)xj , y˜ = αyi + (1− α)yj . (4)
(xi, yi) and (xj , yj) are two examples drawn at random
from the training data, and α ∈ [0, 1]. They showed that
Mixup improves generalization on various tasks.
3. Methods
3.1. Theoretical Motivation
In this section, we theoretically analyze the statistical as-
pects of robust generalization. First, a simple Gaussian data
model is used to demonstrate the need to minimize feature
representation variance for robust generalization. It is then
shown that the optimal model parameter in terms of robust
generalization differs from the model parameter which min-
imizes the adversarial empirical risk using data which con-
sist of robust and non-robust features. Ultimately, we pro-
vide evidence that most deep neural networks are not free
from AFO by showing that even in our simple Gaussian data
model, the robust generalization performance is degraded as
the model is overly trained on adversarial examples.
Based on Example 1 and the linear classifier defined in
Definition 3, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1. For the variance parameters σr and σs (sub-
script r for robust and s for standard), let σr = νσs where
ν ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the upper bound on the standard classifi-
cation error of fn,σs and the upper bound on the `

∞-robust
classification error of fn,σr be equal with probability at
least
(
1− 2 exp
(
− d8(σ2s+1)
))
·
(
1− 2 exp
(
− d8(σ2r+1)
))
if
 ≤ (2
√
n− 1)(1− ν)
2
√
n+ 4σs
. (5)
(All the proofs of the theorems and corollaries in our work
can be found in the supplementary material.) We can see
that the theorem is consistent with our intuition. For exam-
ple, when ν = 1, i.e., when both variances are equal, the
probability that the robust generalization ability for  > 0
is the same as the standard generalization ability effectively
becomes zero. Thus, to ensure that our model shows robust
generalization at the same level as standard generalization,
a smaller variance of feature representations is required than
that of standard learning.
Corollary 1. For the variance parameters σr and σs, let
σr = νσs where ν ∈ [0, 1]. Let the upper bound on the stan-
dard classification error of fn,σs and the upper bound on
the `∞-robust classification error of fn,σr be equal. Then,
as σr decreases, the upper bound of  increases in propor-
tion to pin,σs , which is given by
pin,σs =
2
√
n− 1
σs(2
√
n+ 4σs)
. (6)
Hence, the smaller the variance of feature representa-
tions, the more effective the robust generalization perfor-
mance of the model.
Next, we show the change in the variance of feature rep-
resentations as we train the model to minimize the adver-
sarial empirical risk. Specifically, we utilize the concept of
robust and non-robust features, and show the way in which
adversarial training results in AFO in a model similar to that
used before [36].
Example 2. Let 0 < σA  σB . Then, the distribution
Ψtrue is defined by the following distribution over (x, y) ∈
Rd+1 × {±1} :
y
u.a.r∼ {−1,+1} and
x1 ∼ N (y, σ2A), x2, . . . , xd+1 i.i.d.∼ N (ηy, σ2B).
(7)
Here, x1 is a robust feature that is strongly correlated
with the label, and the other features x2, . . . , xd+1 are non-
robust features that are weakly correlated with the label.
Here, η < 1 is a non-negative constant, which is small but
sufficiently large such that a simple classifier attains a small
standard classification error.
The difficulty associated with robust learning is that
a significantly large sample complexity is required [32].
Given this postulation, we extend Example 2 to Example 3
with the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Assume the number of non-robust features
in our data is N . Then, because of the lack of data samples
in robust learning, M features out of N non-robust features
form a sample distribution which is far from the true distri-
bution.
In Assumption 1, we refer to M non-robust features as
“insufficient” non-robust features. Contrarily, the other non-
robust features are referred to as “sufficient ” non-robust
features.
Example 3. Let 0 < c < d. Then the sample distribution
Ψsample,c which is formed by the sampled input-label pairs
(x, y)
i.i.d.∼ Ψtrue is defined as follows:
y
u.a.r.∼ {−1,+1}, x1 ∼ N (y, σ2A),
x2, . . . , xc+1
i.i.d.∼ N (y, σ2A),
xc+2, . . . , xd+1
i.i.d.∼ N (ηy, σ2B).
(8)
In Example 3, our data has a true distribution as in Exam-
ple 2. However, the Gaussian distribution is changed for the
insufficient non-robust features x2, . . . , xc+1 in our sam-
pled data according to Assumption 1. For simplicity, in this
example, we suppose that the insufficient non-robust fea-
tures form the same sample distribution as that of the robust
features.
We show the variance of feature representations during
adversarial training on Ψsample,c by using the following lin-
ear classifier:
Definition 4. Let Z be a function set. Let w be the weight
vector of the classifier. Let ζf be the objective function of the
linear classifier fw. Then our linear classifier fZ is defined
as
fZ ∈ {fw | ζf ∈ Z,w ∈ Rd+1+ , ‖w‖1 = 1}. (9)
In our model, it is reasonable to investigate the variance
of w>x to show the extent to which adversarial training
affects robust generalization. Based on Example 3 and the
linear classifier defined in Definition 4, we can prove the
following theorem:
Theorem 2. Let wB ∈ Rd−c be the weight vector for the
sufficient non-robust features of Ψsample,c. Let Zsc be a set
of strictly convex functions. Then, when the classifier fZsc is
trained on Ψsample,c, thew?B which minimizes the variance
of w>x with respect to Ψsample,c is
w?B = ~0. (10)
This result is consistent with that of [36], which pre-
sumed that the number of samples for all the non-robust
features is sufficiently large. However, we have a limited
number of samples for the non-robust features in Example
3 and this may cause the result to differ from that of The-
orem 2. Therefore, we need to find w?B with respect to the
true distribution Ψtrue for the purpose of showing robust
generalization ability for our model.
Theorem 3. Let wB ∈ Rd−c be the weight vector for suf-
ficient non-robust features of Ψsample,c. Let Zsc be a set of
strictly convex functions. Then, when the classifier fZsc is
trained on Ψsample,c, the w?B that minimizes the variance
of w>x with respect to Ψtrue is
w?B =
c
cd+ 2c+ 1
·~1. (11)
For simplicity, we assume that the classifier assigns the
same weight value to features with the same distribution in
Theorem 3, and the limited feasible set does not change the
optimal weight of the classifier. As a result, we can pre-
dict the robust generalization performance of the classifier
by observing wB in the robust learning procedure. Note
that Lemma 1 also applies with our classifier. Therefore,
if our sampled data have insufficient non-robust features,
wB approaches ~0 during adversarial training, even though
the optimal w?B is not ~0 in terms of robust generalization.
We refer to this phenomenon as Adversarial Feature Over-
fitting (AFO).
AFO is caused by the relation between the weight values
for the features in our data. In this regard, most deep neu-
ral networks involve intertwined features, suggesting that
most deep neural networks are also adversely affected by
the problem we point out in the example.
Adversarial vertex
Adversarial example
Input 𝑥
𝛿 𝛾 𝛿
Figure 1: Adversarial vertex. The adversarial vertex is lo-
cated in the same direction as the adversarial example but γ
times farther away.
3.2. Adversarial Vertex Mixup
AFO arises when the model is overly optimized only for
sufficient non-robust features, when the training data have
many types of insufficient non-robust features. From this
point of view, we can think of several methods to address
AFO. First, the diversity of the algorithm that constructs ad-
versarial examples during training could be increased. This
may be a fundamental solution to overcome the poor robust
generalization caused by the large sample complexity. Sec-
ond, when the large sample complexity of robust learning
cannot be satisfied, label-smoothing can directly regularize
the overfitting problem as in [34]. Essentially, soft labeling
can be employed to prevent the weights for the sufficient
non-robust features from becoming zero. In this paper, we
present a method to improve the robust generalization using
soft labeling.
Several algorithms that use soft-labeled data to improve
the generalization performance have been proposed [34, 40,
29]. Among them, Mixup [40] trains a model by utilizing
linear interpolation between training data. This method can
be seen as a variant of the label-smoothing method, be-
cause it linearly interpolates both input vectors and their
labels. Inspired by Mixup, we propose Adversarial Vertex
mixup (AVmixup), which is a soft-labeled data augmenta-
tion method designed to improve robust generalization.
AVmixup, similar to Mixup, also extends the training
distribution by using linear interpolation. Unlike Mixup,
however, for each raw input vector, AVmixup defines a vir-
tual vector in the adversarial direction and extends the train-
ing distribution via linear interpolation of the virtual vector
and the raw input vector. We refer to the virtual vector as an
adversarial vertex (see Figure 1). Formally, the adversarial
vertex is defined as follows:
Definition 5. Let δx ∈ Rd be the adversarial perturbation
for the raw input vector x ∈ Rd. Then, for a scaling factor
γ ≥ 1, adversarial vertex xav is defined as
xav = x+ γ · δx. (12)
Figure 1 shows how the adversarial vertex is found. Af-
ter we obtain the adversarial vertex, AVmixup constructs
virtual training examples as follows:
Definition 6. Let (x,y) be the raw input-label pair. Let φ
be a label-smoothing function. Then, for the real value α
sampled from a uniform distribution U(0, 1) and the label-
smoothing parameters λ1 ∈ R and λ2 ∈ R, the virtual
input vector xˆ ∈ Rd and its associated label yˆ ∈ Rk are
constructed by
xˆ = αx+ (1− α)xav,
yˆ = αφ(y, λ1) + (1− α)φ(y, λ2).
(13)
For the label-smoothing function φ, we use an existing
label-smoothing method [34]. Specifically, in the case of k
classes, the algorithm assigns λ ∈ (0, 1) to the true class
and equally distributes 1−λk−1 to the other classes.
In summary, the overall procedure of adversarial training
with AVmixup is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Training with AVmixup
Require: DatasetD, batch size n, training epochs T , learn-
ing rate τ , scaling factor γ, label-smoothing factors
λ1, λ2
Require: Label-smoothing function φ
Require: Adversarial perturbation function G
1: for t = 1 to T do
2: for mini-batch {xi,yi}ni=1 ∼ D do
3: δi ← G(xi,yi;θ)
4: AVmixup:
5: x¯i ← xi + γ · δi, αi ∼ U(0, 1)
6: xˆi ← αixi + (1− αi)x¯i
7: yˆi ← αiφ(yi, λ1) + (1− αi)φ(yi, λ2)
8: model update:
9: θ ← θ − τ · 1n
∑n
i=1∇θL(xˆi, yˆi;θ)
10: end for
11: end for
12: Output: robust model parameter θ
4. Related Work
4.1. Adversarial Attack Methods
Adversarial attacks confuse the trained deep neural net-
works with adversarial examples. The Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [8] is an efficient one-step attack method.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [19] constructs adversar-
ial examples by applying a multi-step variant of FGSM. The
Carlini & Wagner (CW) attack [3] uses a specific objective
function to create adversarial examples under various con-
ditions. Apart from these attacks, many adversarial attacks
exist in white-box settings [27, 24, 17, 23]. In black-box
settings, adversarial attacks are conducted using substitute
models, according to which adversarial examples are gen-
erated from the substitute models [26]. Additionally, black-
box attacks which only rely on the prediction score or the
decision of the model have been proposed [5, 2, 33, 12, 9].
4.2. Adversarial Defense Methods
Various adversarial defense methods have been em-
ployed to make DNNs robust to adversarial attacks. Ad-
versarial training [8] uses adversarial examples as train-
ing data to train the robust network. Many approaches [14,
22, 30, 44, 41] improve the model robustness through reg-
ularizers or variants of adversarial training. Various tech-
niques [21, 20, 38, 31, 37] can defend adversarial attacks
by denoising adversarial perturbations from input data or
detect adversarial examples from among the input data. We
cover further related works in the supplementary material.
5. Experimental Results And Discussion
In this section, we show that label-smoothing [34] and
AVmixup improve the robust generalization with exten-
sive experiments across many benchmark datasets includ-
ing CIFAR10 [15], CIFAR100 [15], SVHN [25] and Tiny
Imagenet [6]. Especially, we note that the combination
of AVmixup with the state-of-the-art adversarial defense
method [41], would enable us to significantly outperform
existing defense methods. A description of the datasets used
in the experiments is summarized in the supplementary ma-
terial.
5.1. Implementation Details
We use WRN-34-10 [39] for the experiments on CIFAR,
WRN-16-8 [39] for the experiments on SVHN, and PreAc-
tResNet18 [10] for the experiments on Tiny Imagenet. We
run 80k training steps on CIFAR and SVHN and 50k train-
ing steps on Tiny Imagenet. The initial learning rate for CI-
FAR and Tiny Imagenet is set to 0.1 and 0.01 for SVHN.
The learning rate decay is applied at 50% and 75% of to-
tal training steps with decay factor 0.1, and weight decay
factor is set to 2e−4. We use the same adversarial pertur-
bation budget  = 8 as in [19]. To evaluate adversarial de-
fense methods, we apply several adversarial attacks includ-
ing FGSM [8], PGD [19], CW [3] (PGD approach with CW
loss) and transfer-based black-box attack [26]. We mainly
compare the following settings in our experiments:
1. Standard: The model which is trained with the original
dataset.
Table 1: Comparison of the accuracy of our proposed ap-
proach AVmixup with that of PGD [19] and LSλ (λ ∈
{0.8, 0.9}) [34] against white-box attacks on CIFAR10.
Model Clean FGSM PGD10 PGD20 CW20
Standard 95.48 7.25 0.0 0.0 0.0
PGD 86.88 62.68 47.69 46.34 47.35
LS0.8 87.28 66.09 53.49 50.87 50.60
LS0.9 87.64 65.96 52.82 50.29 50.30
AVmixup 93.24 78.25 62.67 58.23 53.63
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Figure 2: CIFAR10 accuracy curves. The robustness of
the PGD model (blue line) overfits after 40k steps. The
AVmixup model, on the other hand, shows a steady increase
in robustness (red line).
2. PGD: The model trained using adversarial examples
from PGD [19] with step size = 2, iterative steps = 10.
3. LSλ: With the PGD-based approach [19], we apply the
label-smoothing method [34] for the model with label-
smoothing factor λ.
4. AVmixup: We apply our proposed method for the model
with the PGD-based approach [19].
Note that PGD and CW attacks with T iterative steps are
denoted as PGDT and CWT , respectively, and the original
test set is denoted as Clean.
5.2. CIFAR10
Because the CIFAR10 dataset is the most commonly
used dataset for adversarial robustness studies [19, 38, 44,
41], we analyze our method in both white-box and black-
box settings, and compare our method to a state-of-the-
art defense method, TRADES [44], on CIFAR10. We set
the scaling factor γ = 2.0 and label-smoothing factors
λ1 = 1.0 and λ2 = 0.1 in the following experiments.
Empirical evidence for AFO We provide Figure 2 in
support of our theoretical analysis and the effectiveness of
AVmixup. In Figure 2, the validation accuracy curve against
PGD10 of the PGD model shows that the model starts to
overfit from about 40k steps, while the AVmixup model
continues to improve.
White-box setting We conduct white-box attacks on the
models trained with baseline methods and our proposed
method AVmixup. We set the step size = 2.0 for PGD
and CW attacks. We first evaluate the models on Clean to
compare the trade-off between accuracy and robustness of
the models. Then, we evaluate the models against FGSM,
PGD10, PGD20, and CW20. The results are summarized in
Table 1.
The results in Table 1 indicate that models trained with
soft labels are more accurate in all attacks including clean
data than the model trained with one-hot labels, which is
consistent with our theoretical analysis. In particular, the ac-
curacy on PGD20 of the AVmixup model is 11.89%p higher
than that of the PGD model, with a decrease of only 2.24%p
in accuracy on Clean compared to the Standard model.
Black-box setting Athalye et al. [1] indicated that obfus-
cated gradients, a phenomenon that leads to non-true adver-
sarial defenses, can be identified in several ways. One such
way is black-box attack evaluation.
In black-box settings, we apply transfer-based black-box
attacks to the models [26]. After constructing adversarial
examples from each of the trained models, we apply these
adversarial examples to the other models and evaluate the
performances. The results are summarized in Table 2, and
more results can be found in the supplementary material.
The columns represent the attack models of the transfer-
based black-box attacks, and the rows represent the defense
models which are evaluated. The results in Table 2 indi-
cate that the AVmixup model is the most robust against
black-box attacks from all of the attack models with signif-
icant margins. We also observe that the model trained with
AVmixup shows higher accuracy against black-box attacks
than against white-box attacks. Thus, we confirm that our
proposed method improves the adversarial defense perfor-
mance as a result of an increase in the robustness of the
model rather than with obfuscated gradients [1].
Comparison We compare our method with a re-
cently proposed defense method, TRADES [44], which
uses a regularization-based adversarial training approach.
TRADES requires approximately twice as much GPU
memory as conventional adversarial training to calculate the
additional regularization term which processes both natu-
ral examples and adversarial examples simultaneously. In
contrast, AVmixup hardly incurs additional cost and can be
implemented with only a few lines of code. In this exper-
iment, we implement AVmixup based on the official Py-
Table 2: Accuracy comparisons against transfer-based
black-box attacks (PGD20).
Defense
model
Attack model
Standard PGD LS0.8 LS0.9
PGD 85.6 - 65.70 64.91
LS0.8 86.03 63.60 - 64.83
LS0.9 86.40 63.74 65.78 -
AVmixup 89.53 68.51 71.48 70.50
Table 3: Accuracy comparisons with TRADES [44].
Models Clean PGD20
PGD [44] 87.3 47.04
TRADES (1/λ = 1) [44] 88.64 49.14
TRADES (1/λ = 6) [44] 84.92 56.61
AVmixup 90.36 58.27
Torch code of TRADES [44] and train the model with the
same configurations as [19]. The results are listed in Ta-
ble 3, which shows that our proposed method has superior
robustness with a smaller trade-off than TRADES.
Discussion In Tabel 1, in contrast with FGSM, PGD10
and PGD20, the AVmixup model does not show signifi-
cant improvement against the CW20 attack, and this trend
becomes more severe for challenging datasets that have a
larger number of classes and smaller number of training ex-
amples per class such as CIFAR100. We can infer that this
property appears as AVmixup uses linear interpolations. In
other words, algorithms that utilize virtual data constructed
using linear interpolation between data points tightly gen-
eralize only the features observed in the training steps. We
confirm this explanation by a simple experiment, the details
and further discussion of which can be found in the supple-
mentary material. It implies that while AVmixup shows a
high level of robustness against adversarial attacks used in
adversarial training, it may not be able to withstand other
types of attacks. Therefore, the diversity of adversarial ex-
amples generated during the adversarial training procedure
is even more important for AVmixup. We thus report the re-
sults of AVmixup combined with the PGD-based approach
by focusing on PGD-based attacks. The results using an
algorithm that constructs diverse adversarial examples are
discussed in Section 5.4.
5.3. Other Datasets
We also verify the effectiveness of our method on CI-
FAR100, SVHN and Tiny Imagenet. We specify the same
hyperparameters for AVmixup as in the CIFAR10 experi-
ments. The results from these experiments are provided in
Table 4.
Table 4: Comparisons of AVmixup on SVHN [25], CI-
FAR100 [15], and Tiny ImageNet [6].
Dataset Model Clean FGSM PGD20
CIFAR100
PGD 61.29 46.01 25.17
LS0.8 62.1 52.33 28.81
LS0.9 61.77 53.17 27.13
AVmixup 74.81 62.76 38.49
SVHN
PGD 92.4 75.31 58.22
LS0.8 92.15 75.84 59.75
LS0.9 92.34 76.14 59.28
AVmixup 95.59 81.83 61.90
Tiny ImageNet
PGD 41.67 20.30 13.14
LS0.8 42.89 22.75 15.43
LS0.9 41.71 20.96 14.03
AVmixup 54.27 35.46 20.31
CIFAR100 Tabel 4 shows that the accuracy of AVmixup
increases by 13.52%p and 13.32%p for Clean and PGD20,
respectively, compared to the PGD model. The results of
additional experiments on CIFAR100 can be found in the
supplementary material.
SVHN The SVHN image classification task is much eas-
ier than the image classification tasks with more compli-
cated input images such as CIFAR and Tiny Imagenet. As
shown previously [32], generalization problems with poor
robustness are less common for simple image datasets such
as MNIST than for complex image datasets such as CIFAR.
Thus, it is possible to predict that our proposed method,
starting from the robust generalization problem, would be
less effective on the SVHN dataset than on other datasets,
and it is indeed observed from Table 4. The accuracy of
AVmixup improves by 3.19%p and 3.68%p compared to
the PGD model for Clean and PGD20, respectively, which
are small improvements compared to those observed on the
other datasets that are tested.
Tiny Imagenet Tabel 4 shows an improvement in accu-
racy of 12.6%p and 7.17%p compared to the PGD model
for Clean and PGD20, respectively.
5.4. When AVmixup Meets Diversity
As discussed in 5.2, the diversity of adversarial examples
during adversarial training is important to enable AVmixup
to be effective against various adversarial attacks. In this
sense, we utilize a recent method [41] (Feature Scatter)
which promotes data diversity by taking the inter-sample
relationships into consideration during adversarial training.
We combine Feature Scatter with our method AVmixup,
Table 5: Comparisons of AVmixup with feature scattering-based approach [41]. For PGD, we refer to the accuracy of [41].
For Feature Scatter, we reproduce and evaluate the model at the end of the training.
Dataset Model Clean FGSM PGD20 PGD100 CW20 CW100
CIFAR10
PGD [41] 85.7 54.9 44.9 44.8 45.7 45.4
Feature Scatter 90.22 78.19 69.74 67.35 60.77 58.29
Feature Scatter + AVmixup 92.37 83.49 82.31 81.88 71.88 69.50
CIFAR100
PGD [41] 59.9 28.5 22.6 22.3 23.2 23.0
Feature Scatter 74.9 72.99 45.29 42.77 27.35 24.89
Feature Scatter + AVmixup 78.62 78.92 47.28 46.29 33.20 31.22
SVHN
PGD [41] 93.9 68.4 47.9 46.0 48.7 47.3
Feature Scatter 96.42 95.92 58.67 46.98 51.23 38.89
Feature Scatter + AVmixup 96.07 95.26 73.65 70.24 67.06 62.01
Table 6: Sensitivity of the combination of AVmixup and
Feature Scatter to label-smoothing factors (γ = 1) on CI-
FAR10.
λ1 / λ2 Clean FGSM PGD20 CW20
0.1 / 0.5 91.94 80.09 74.43 62.87
0.5 / 0.3 92.82 77.81 57.67 55.18
0.5 / 0.5 92.25 80.54 71.55 63.01
0.5 / 0.7 92.37 83.49 82.31 71.88
0.5 / 1.0 92.11 81.75 78.70 62.96
1.0 / 0.5 93.07 79.55 53.42 56.72
and evaluate the performance of the model on CIFAR10,
CIFAR100 and SVHN.
We implement AVmixup on the PyTorch code of Fea-
ture Scatter released in [41], hence we use the same model
architecture and configuration as in this report [41]. For CI-
FAR10 and SVHN, we set (γ = 1.0, λ1 = 0.5, λ2 = 0.7).
For CIFAR100, we set (γ = 1.5, λ1 = 0.3, λ2 = 0.42). We
evaluate the models at the end of the training. The results
are summarized in Table 5.
The joint application of AVmixup with Feature Scat-
ter results in significantly higher accuracy than with Fea-
ture Scatter alone. Specifically, on CIFAR10, the combi-
nation shows powerful adversarial robustness of 82.31%
and 81.88% for PGD20 and PGD100, respectively. Fur-
thermore, our experiments on SVHN demonstrate state-of-
the-art robustness against the PGD and CW attacks. More-
over, in contrast with the experimental results of the models
trained with the PGD-based approach, the combination of
AVmixup and Feature Scatter shows a significant improve-
ment not only for PGD attacks but also for CW attacks.
Note that the results on CIFAR100 differ from those on
CIFAR10 or SVHN. The combination also provides state-
of-the-art accuracy in all respects, but the increase in accu-
racy for PGD and CW is small compared to that for other
datasets. We can infer the reason for these results from Ta-
ble 6, which indicates that the combination is sensitive to
the label-smoothing factors. In this respect, as the number of
labels of the dataset increases, the sensitivity of the combi-
nation to soft label values increases, which may destabilize
the effect of AVmixup. In addition, we can see that the ac-
curacy on FGSM is slightly higher than that on Clean. This
is because of the property of AVmixup, not because of la-
bel leaking [18], since the feature scattering-based approach
prevents label leaking. Furthermore, as a larger scaling fac-
tor is set for CIFAR100 than for the other datasets that are
tested, the average of the vectors used as the training sam-
ples is farther away in the adversarial direction from the raw
input vector by the larger scaling factor, and this, combined
with the property of AVmixup discussed in Section 5.2, can
cause such a result. Further discussions of the results can be
found in the supplementary material.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we identified AFO, the phenomenon that
leads to poor robust generalization, and used both the-
oretical and empirical approaches to show the extent to
which soft labeling can help improve robust generaliza-
tion. We also introduced AVmixup, a soft-labeled data aug-
mentation method, and demonstrated its outstanding perfor-
mance through extensive experiments. Although AVmixup
has shown its excellence in various experiments, the disad-
vantage of AVmixup is that it imports and uses the linear in-
terpolation without considering the nature of the adversarial
examples. This forces the appropriate hyperparameters for
AVmixup to be found by line search or exhaustive search,
and this task will be time consuming if there are limited re-
sources available. Therefore, we aim to develop advanced
algorithms by analyzing in detail the meaning and effects
of linear interpolation in AVmixup for future research.
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Appendices
A. Proofs
Theorem 1. For the variance parameters σr and σs, let
σr = νσs where ν ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the upper bound on
the standard classification error of fn,σs and the upper
bound on the `∞-robust classification error of fn,σr are
equal with probability at least
(
1− 2 exp
(
− d8(σ2s+1)
))
·(
1− 2 exp
(
− d8(σ2r+1)
))
if
 ≤ (2
√
n− 1)(1− ν)
2
√
n+ 4σs
. (14)
Proof. We recall the following theorems due to Schmidt et
al. [32]:
Theorem 18. (Schmidt et al.) Let (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈
Rd × {±1} be drawn i.i.d. from a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model
with ‖θ?‖2 =
√
d. Let the weight vector w ∈ Rd be the
unit vector in the direction of z¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 yixi. Then, with
probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
− d8(σ2+1)
)
, the linear clas-
sifier fw has classification error at most
exp
{(
− (2
√
n− 1)2d
2(2
√
n+ 4σ)2σ2
)}
. (15)
Theorem 21. (Schmidt et al.) Let (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) ∈
Rd × {±1} be drawn i.i.d. from a (θ?, σ)-Gaussian model
with ‖θ?‖2 =
√
d. Let the weight vector w ∈ Rd be the
unit vector in the direction of z¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 yixi. Then, with
probability at least 1 − 2 exp
(
− d8(σ2+1)
)
, the linear clas-
sifier fw has `∞-robust classification error at most β if
 ≤ 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σ
− σ
√
2 log 1/β√
d
. (16)
When the upper bound on the standard classification error
of fn,σs and the upper bound on the `

∞-robust classification
error of fn,σr are equal, we can find the condition of  by
substituting (15) into β in (16). Then, the right-hand side of
(16) can be written as
2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σr
− σr
σs
· 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σs
. (17)
Since σr = νσs where ν ∈ [0, 1], it satisfies
2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σr
− σr
σs
· 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σs
≥ 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σs
−σr
σs
· 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σs
=
(2
√
n− 1)(1− ν)
2
√
n+ 4σs
.
(18)
Corollary 1. For the variance parameters σr and σs, let
σr = νσs where ν ∈ [0, 1]. Let the upper bound on the stan-
dard classification error of fn,σs and the upper bound on
the `∞-robust classification error of fn,σr be equal. Then,
as σr decreases, the upper bound of  increases in propor-
tion to pin,σs , which is given by
pin,σs =
2
√
n− 1
σs(2
√
n+ 4σs)
. (19)
Proof. Let ′ be the upper bound on  in Theorem A. Then,
the gradient of ′ with respect to σr is
∂′
∂σr
=
∂′
∂ν
∂ν
∂σr
= − 2
√
n− 1
2
√
n+ 4σs
· 1
σs
(20)
Therefore, when σr decreases, the upper bound of  in-
creases in proportion to − ∂
′
∂σr
, which is pin,σs .
Theorem 2. Let wB ∈ Rd−c be the weight vector for the
sufficient non-robust features of Ψsample,c. Let Zsc be a set
of strictly convex functions. Then, when the classifier fZsc is
trained on Ψsample,c, thew?B which minimizes the variance
of wTx with respect to Ψsample,c is
w?B = ~0. (21)
Proof. Let Σ ∈ R(d+1)×(d+1) be the diagonal matrix,
where Σ = diag(σ21 , · · · , σ2d+1) and σ2i is the variance of
each xi with i ∈ {1, · · · , d + 1}. Then, the optimization
problem is
min
w
wTΣw s.t. w ∈ Rd+1+ , ‖w‖1 = 1. (22)
As the objective function over the feasible set is strictly con-
vex, one optimal weight w? exists at the most. In addition,
we can prove that the optimal weight values for features
having the same distribution are equal by using Jensen’s In-
equality. Thus, we obtain
w?i = w
?
j , ∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · , c+ 1}, or
∀i, j ∈ {c+ 2, · · · , d+ 1}. (23)
We now let w?A be the optimal weight value of xi, where
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , c + 1}, and we let w?B be the optimal weight
value of xj , where ∀j ∈ {c + 2, · · · , d+ 1}. Let σ?z be the
optimal (minimal) variance of wTx. Then, we have σ?z
2 =
(c + 1)w?A
2σ2A + (d − c)w?B2σ2B . Thus, σ?z2 is the same as
the solution of the optimization problem
min
wB
(c+ 1)w2Aσ
2
A + (d− c)w2Bσ2B
s.t. (c+ 1)wA + (d− c)wB = 1.
(24)
The constraint results in wA = (1 − (d − c)wB)/(c + 1),
which enable us to rewrite the optimization problem as
min
wB
(1− (d− c)wB)2
c+ 1
σ2A + (d− c)w2Bσ2B . (25)
Then, we can find the optimal w?B as follows:
d
dwB
(
(1− (d− c)wB)2
c+ 1
σ2A + (d− c)w2Bσ2B
)
= 2wB
(
(d− c)2σ2A
c+ 1
+ (d− c)σ2B
)
−2
(
(d− c)σ2A
c+ 1
)
= 0.
(26)
Since 0 < σA  σB , we have the optimal w?B
w?B =
σ2A
(d− c)σ2A + (c+ 1)σ2B
·~1 ≈ ~0. (27)
as desired.
Theorem 3. Let wB ∈ Rd−c be the weight vector for the
sufficient non-robust features of Ψsample,c. Let Zsc be a set
of strictly convex functions. Then, when the classifier fZsc is
trained on Ψsample,c, thew?B which minimizes the variance
of wTx with respect to Ψtrue is
w?B =
c
cd+ 2c+ 1
·~1. (28)
Proof. As with Theorem A, let σz be the variance ofwTx.
Because we train the classifier fZsc on Ψsample,c but min-
imize the variance of wTx with respect to Ψtrue, we have
σ?z
2 = w?A
2σ2A + cw
?
A
2σ2B + (d − c)w?B2σ2B . Thus, σ?z2 is
the same as the solution of the optimization problem
min
wB
w2Aσ
2
A + cw
2
Aσ
2
B + (d− c)w2Bσ2B
s.t. (c+ 1)wA + (d− c)wB = 1.
(29)
The constraint results in wA = (1 − (d − c)wB)/(c + 1),
which enable us to rewrite the objective function as
(1− (d− c)wB)2
(c+ 1)2
(σ2A + cσ
2
B) + (d− c)w2Bσ2B . (30)
Then, we can find the optimal w?B as follows:
d
dwB
(
(1− (d− c)wB)2
(c+ 1)2
(σ2A + cσ
2
B) + (d− c)w2Bσ2B
)
= 2wB
(
(d− c)2
(c+ 1)2
(σ2A + cσ
2
B) + (d− c)σ2B
)
−2
(
(d− c)(σ2A + cσ2B)
(c+ 1)2
)
= ~0.
(31)
Since 0 < σA  σB , we have the optimal w?B
w?B =
σ2A + cσ
2
B
(d− c)(σ2A + cσ2B) + (c+ 1)2σ2B
·~1
≈ c
cd+ 2c+ 1
·~1.
(32)
as desired. If we confine our feasible set to
wi = wj , ∀i, j ∈ {1, · · · , c+ 1},
or ∀i, j ∈ {c+ 2, · · · , d+ 1}, (33)
which does not change the optimal weightw? we can easily
predict the robust generalization performance in the robust
learning procedure using (30).
Lemma 1. (Tsipras et al.) Minimizing the adversarial em-
pirical risk results in a classifier that assigns 0 weight to
non-robust features.
Proof. We can follow the proof of Tsipras et al. [36], i.e., let
L(x, y;w) be the loss function of our classifier fw. Then,
the optimization problem of our model in adversarial train-
ing is
min
w
E
[
max
‖δ‖∞≤
L(x+ δ, y;w)
]
. (34)
Consider any weight w for which wi > 0 for some
i ≥ c + 2. Because the sufficient non-robust features
xc+2, . . . , xd+1 are normally distributed random variables
with mean ηy, the adversary reverses the sign of the suffi-
cient non-robust features if η < . Then, it assigns negative
update values with a high probability, because the sufficient
non-robust features are moved such that their signs are op-
posite to that of the label. Thus, the optimizer constantly
updates the weight vector such that the weight values wi,
where ∀i ≥ c + 2, move toward 0. Ultimately, the opti-
mization of the objective function assigns 0 weight to the
non-robust features.
B. Dataset
We conducted experiments on the CIFAR10 [15], CI-
FAR100 [15], SVHN [25], and Tiny Imagenet [6] datasets.
As shown in Table 7, the CIFAR10 and SVHN datasets
comprise fewer classes and more data per class than other
datasets such as the CIFAR100 and Tiny Imagenet datasets.
Thus, the classification task of CIFAR100 and Tiny Ima-
genet are significantly more difficult than the tasks of CI-
FAR10 and SVHN.
Table 7: Dataset configuration used in the experiments.
Dataset Train Size Test Size Class Size Image Size
CIFAR10 50,000 10,000 10 (32, 32)
CIFAR100 50,000 10,000 100 (32, 32)
SVHN 73,257 26,032 10 (32, 32)
Tiny Imagenet 100,000 20,000 200 (64, 64)
Table 8: Accuracy comparisons of our proposed approach AVmixup with PGD [19] and LSλ (λ ∈ {0.8, 0.9}) [34] against
white-box attacks on CIFAR100.
Model Clean FGSM PGD10 PGD20 CW20
Standard 78.57 6.56 0.0 0.0 0.0
PGD 61.29 46.04 25.76 25.17 22.98
LS0.8 62.1 52.33 29.47 28.81 26.15
LS0.9 61.77 53.17 27.71 27.13 25.34
AVmixup 74.81 62.76 39.98 38.49 23.46
C. Further Related Work
In this section, we introduce two recent works [42, 43]
that utilized Mixup [40] in adversarial defense. Pang et
al. [43] developed Mixup Inference (MI), an inference
principle, by focusing on the globally linear behavior in-
between the data manifolds introduced by the mixup train-
ing method. MI feeds the linear interpolation between the
adversarial example and a sampled clean example into the
classifier. The main difference between AVmixup and MI is
that MI is an algorithm applied only in the inference step
while AVmixup is applied only in the training step.
Lamb et al. [42] proposed Interpolated Adversarial
Training (IAT), the interpolation based adversarial training.
IAT takes two losses in a training step, one is from interpo-
lations between clean examples, and the other is from that
between adversarial exampels. AVmixup, on the other hand,
takes interpolations between the clean example and its ad-
versarial vertex. Ultimately, IAT improves standard test er-
ror while maintaining the robustness, and AVmixup simul-
taneously improves both the standard accuracy and the ad-
versarial robustness.
D. Detailed Experimental Results
We present the detailed results of accuracy against white-
box attacks on CIFAR100 in Table 8. AVmixup significantly
improves the accuracy for Clean, FGSM, and PGD, but its
improvement on CW20 is limited.
Additionally, we also provide the results of accuracy
against black-box attacks on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 in
Tables 9 and 10, respectively. The models of each column
represent the attack models of the transfer-based black-box
attacks, and the models of each row represent the evaluated
defense models. It is evident that the AVmixup model is the
most robust against black-box attacks from all of the attack
models with significant margins.
E. Empirical Evidence on the Nature of Mixup
We previously mentioned that utilizing virtual data con-
structed by linear interpolation promotes the tight general-
ization of features observed in the training steps. In addi-
tion, we demonstrated that the accuracy of the combination
of AVmixup with a feature scattering-based approach (Fea-
ture Scatter) against FGSM on CIFAR100 is slightly higher
than that on Clean. In this section, we introduce the experi-
mental results, which support the hypothesis. The following
settings are compared in the experiment:
1. Standard: The model that is trained with the original
dataset.
2. Mixup: With the original dataset, we apply Mixup [40]
for the model.
3. Gvrm: The model that is trained by Vicinal Risk Mini-
mization (VRM) with a Gaussian kernel [4].
4. Noisy mixup: With the Gaussian-noise-added dataset,
we apply Mixup [40] for the model.
The original test set and the Gaussian-noise-added-test set
are denoted as Clean and Noise, respectively, and we used
the same Gaussian distribution N(0, 82) for both the train-
ing and evaluation procedures.
Based on Table 11, we confirm the strong generalization
performance of the mixup algorithm. In other words, the
Mixup model and the Noisy mixup model show the highest
accuracy on Clean and Noise, respectively.
To understand the property of AVmixup, we should fo-
cus on the results of the Noisy mixup model, which shows
the worst accuracy on Clean and the best accuracy on Noise.
Moreover, the accuracy on Noise is significantly higher than
Table 9: Accuracy comparisons against transfer-based black-box attacks on CIFAR10.
PGD20 CW20
Model Standard PGD LS0.8 LS0.9 AVmixup Standard PGD LS0.8 LS0.9 AVmixup
PGD 85.6 - 65.70 64.91 72.30 85.77 - 66.32 65.68 72.25
LS0.8 86.03 63.6 - 64.83 72.34 86.02 64.37 - 65.51 72.28
LS0.9 86.4 63.74 65.78 - 72.67 86.59 64.46 66.31 - 72.82
AVmixup 89.53 68.51 71.48 70.50 - 89.65 69.40 71.72 70.97 -
Table 10: Accuracy comparisons against transfer-based black-box attacks on CIFAR100.
PGD20 CW20
Model Standard PGD LS0.8 LS0.9 AVmixup Standard PGD LS0.8 LS0.9 AVmixup
PGD 51.59 - 36.68 36.74 40.88 51.97 - 37.99 38.62 40.15
LS0.8 60.27 41.44 - 37.61 46.27 60.35 42.15 - 38.01 44.6
LS0.9 59.93 40.68 36.86 - 45.73 60.3 41.61 36.97 - 44.42
AVmixup 67.69 44.78 44.86 45.3 - 68.02 43.83 44.8 45.95 -
that on Clean by 2.29%p. This implies that the Noisy mixup
model tightly generalizes the input distribution, which is
slightly changed owing to Gaussian noise during the train-
ing. Therefore, AVmixup with the PGD-based approach
does not show a high level of robustness against other types
of adversarial attacks, and the accuracy of AVmixup with
Feature Scatter against FGSM on CIFAR100 can be higher
than that on Clean for a high scaling factor (γ = 1.5).
Table 11: Accuracy (median over 5 runs) comparisons on
Clean and Noise.
Model Clean Noise
Standard 94.52 85.8
Mixup 95.93 88.97
Gvrm 92.77 92.96
Noisy mixup 92.56 94.85
Table 12: Accuracy results of AVmixup with PGD-based
approach on CIFAR10. γ is the scaling factor of AVmixup,
and λ1 and λ2 are label-smoothing factors for the raw input
and the adversarial vertex, respectively.
γ = 1.0 γ = 2.0
λ1 / λ2 Clean PGD10 Clean PGD10
1.0 / 0.1 92.88 7.43 92.63 53.19
1.0 / 0.5 91.29 42.49 92.04 49.33
0.5 / 0.1 92.59 14.07 91.78 51.43
0.5 / 0.7 90.12 47.36 84.93 53.06
F. Ablation Study on CIFAR10
To analyze the sensitivity of AVmixup to the hyperpa-
rameters, we conducted an ablation study, and the results
are summarized in Tables 12 and 13. As shown in both ta-
bles, the larger the λ1, the higher is the accuracy on Clean.
Furthermore, λ1 and λ2 imply the weights on standard accu-
racy and adversarial robustness, respectively. However, they
do not fit perfectly as changes occured by other conditions.
From the comparisons based on γ, it is evident that
AVmixup with the PGD-based and feature scattering-based
approaches yielded the highest accuracy at γ = 1 and at
γ = 2, respectively. This is owing to the difference in the
construction of adversarial examples between the two ap-
proaches. Because the PGD-based approach constructs ad-
versarial examples using a multi-step method, adversarial
examples are located in the `∞-bounded cube. Otherwise,
because the feature scattering-based approach constructs
adversarial examples using a one-step method, adversar-
ial examples are located on the surface of the `∞-bounded
cube. Therefore, with the PGD-based approach, AVmixup
requires a larger scaling factor to cover the `∞-bounded
space. Likewise, with the feature scatter-based approach,
AVmixup requires the scaling factor of 1 to cover the
`∞-bounded space.
The sensitivity of AVmixup is largely related to the label-
smoothing factors, which tune the input data labels for ro-
bust generalization based on our theoretical results. They
are also connected to the Lipschitz constant for the classi-
fier, with respect to the training samples in adversarial direc-
tions. This complex relationship causes the observed high-
sensitivity. This may be interpreted as a fault of AVmixup,
but also provides meaningful insight into useful directions
for future research.
Table 13: Accuracy results of AVmixup with feature scattering-based approach on CIFAR10.
γ = 1.0 γ = 2.0
λ1 / λ2 Clean FGSM PGD20 CW20 Clean FGSM PGD20 CW20
0.1 / 0.5 91.94 80.09 74.43 62.87 90.87 93.42 72.94 70.11
0.5 / 0.3 92.82 77.81 57.67 55.18 95.41 95.32 60.95 47.32
0.5 / 0.7 92.37 83.49 82.31 71.88 95.2 95.86 52.87 47.79
1.0 / 0.5 93.07 79.55 53.42 56.72 95.43 95.12 47.41 44.14
G. Code
Our codes are available at https://github.com/
Saehyung-Lee/cifar10_challenge.
